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Through a field experiment in Sri Lanka I analyze the role of experimentally-induced
memories of 2004 tsunami on behavior in a trust game in which personal notions of cheat-
ing are elicited. Micro-finance borrowers were randomly assigned to a treatment (control)
group consisting in watching a video about the calamity before (after) playing. Trust game
participants were asked how much to receive (return) in order not to (make the counterpart)
feel cheated; in a survey they selected whether the video mostly reminded about solidarity,
looting or the calamity experience. Results suggest a differential impact of emotional stimuli
induced by the video-treatment on trustors’ definition of cheating and trustees’ intentional
cheating. Among the treated, the probability trustors define cheating as a non-negative
return on investment (i.e. receive no more than what invested) and trustees satisfy trustor’s
cheating notion (i.e. return at least what makes him/her not feel cheated) is higher when
recalling solidarity than when looting and/or the calamity. As expected, there are no signif-
icant emotional effects of the video on control group’s behavior. If the trust game replicates
real investment decisions, identifying the channels through which emotional memories of a
past shock affect behavior offer important insights on what hinders socio-economic transac-
tions within post-disaster areas.
JEL Codes: C90, D03, O12.
Keywords: natural disaster, trust, cheating, return on investment, trustworthiness, emo-
tions, random experiment.
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1 Introduction
In the last years the experimental literature on social preferences in developing countries has
witnessed a huge growth due to the increasing number of field-studies providing insights on what
influences individuals’ decisions in vulnerable contexts. In particular, a part of this literature
is being investigating the impact of natural or man-made disasters on time, risk and social
preferences by comparing affected and non-affected individuals or villages.1 From the seminal
articles by Elster (1998) and Loewenstein (2000) underlining the importance of emotions in
economic decisions, another part of the experimental literature is being recently investigating
how positive, negative or neutral affect induced in the lab influence individuals’ behavior. This
study bridges the two literatures by investigating the role of emotional memories of a past shock
on socio-economic investment decisions of individuals exposed to frequent shock-recalling stimuli
in their everyday life. The latter are likely to be subject to continuous incidental emotional states
deriving from the external environment (i.e., for instance, broken roads, damaged houses, injured
relatives, etc.) which might influence actual and expected behavior in different ways according
to the emotional characteristics of the most salient affected/non-affected individuals’ memory
of the shock. In this work the impact of tsunami-related memories on social preferences in Sri
Lanka is analyzed by testing whether and how emotions induced by a short videoclip refreshing
the calamity experience affect individual’s decisions in an anonymous one-shot trust game (Berg
et al., 1995).
This paper offers an original contribution to the above-mentioned literature in many re-
spects. First, this experiment is implemented 7 years after the shock so that it is capable to
catch long run effects of the disaster on social preferences by exploiting the random variation in
emotional status associated to different memories of the event. Specifically, in order to refresh
the emotional stimulus of the past calamity, a sample of Sri Lankan micro-finance borrowers
was showed a video on the 2004 tsunami2. Importantly, half sample was randomly assigned to
1Notably, these studies often reach different conclusions even when they focus on the same area or use a similar
design. With respect to natural shocks, Callen (2010) find Sri Lankan villagers who are affected by the tsunami
in 2004 are on average less impatient than non-affected while Cassar et al. (2011)’s findings concerning Thai
victims go in an opposite direction. Eckel et al. (2009) and Willinger et al. (2013) provide experimental evidence
of lower risk aversion respectively among Hurricane Katrina evacuees and individuals living Indonesian volcanic
areas while Cassar et al. (2011) and Cameron and Shah (2011) document a significant increase in risk aversion
among victims of natural shock (in Thailand and Indonesia, respectively). Whitt and Wilson (2007) report an
increase of group cooperation in the aftermath of the Hurricane Katrina and similarly Cassar et al. (2011) find
Thai tsunami-victims are more trusting and moderately more trustworthy than non victims. Conversely, Fleming
et al. (2011) find the Chilean 2010 earthquake was detrimental for trustworthiness while Becchetti et al. (2012)
find that the recovery aid restored the loss of altruism witnessed by Sri Lankan tsunami-victims after 7 years
from the event. As far as manmade calamities are concerned, evidence of higher discount rates is provided by
Voors et al. (2010) for individuals exposed to violence in Burundi while civil war is showed to be detrimental for
trust and trustworthiness in Kenya (Becchetti et al., 2014) and Tajikistan (Cassar et al., 2013).
2The use of video clips to induce different emotions is common in psychological literature and, recently, it
is being adopted also for economic experiments. For instance, Johnson and Tversky (1983) find that incidental
affect (i.e., a mood state) induced by reading an article on newspapers influences risk judgments; see also, among
others, Gross and Levenson (1995), Kirchsteiger et al. (2006) and Oswald et al.(2008) for similar studies on affect
and behavior.
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a treatment consisting in watching the clip before they could take decisions in a one-shot trust
game while the remaining one to a control group who watched it after the game. Their decisions
in the trust game are then compared on the basis of survey answers to a question about what
scenario the video mostly reminded to them —participants were asked to choose among solidar-
ity, looting and the calamity experiences which can be psychologically categorized respectively
as positive, negative and neutral affect. The design of an emotional-based experiment frames
this study in the economic and psychological literature on the role of mood manipulation on
subjects’ behavior and, more generally, on the importance of emotions in socio-economic de-
cision making (see, among others, Loewenstein, 2000, Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003, Vohs et
al, 2004 and Isen, 2008).3 As an example, through different mood-manipulating treatments
Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011) find subjects assigned to positive affect-inducing treatment show
lower time preference than do those exposed to a neutral affect-inducing one. With this de-
sign, however, rather than inducing alternative moods with different videos, only one video
treatment is implemented: all participants watched the same video clip and and their different
emotional reactions to its content are collected in an post-experimental survey. A part from
replicating the real-world situation in which all inhabitants are exposed to the same calamity
but can react in different emotional ways to it, the treatment-control design based on projecting
the video before-after the game allows also to control for potential individual’s heterogeneous
characteristics influencing emotional responses and/or experimental behavior.4
The second original contribution of this study hinges on a novel experimental feature. A
standard trust-investment game (Berg et al. 1995) is implemented, where - in an anonymous
setting - a player (trustor) is endowed with a sum of money and has to decide how much
to send to the counterpart (trustee); the amount sent is tripled and the trustee chooses how
much of it to return to the trustor. The novel modification of this standard game consists
in the elicitation of subjects’ notion of “being cheated” as the amount of money the trustor
would need to receive in order not to feel cheated (cheating threshold) and the amount of
3In the growing economic literature on the role of emotions, positive affect has been shown to increase
reciprocity (Kirchsteiger et al., 2006), productivity (Oswald et al., 2008), loss (Isen et al., 1988) and risk aversion
(Isen and Geva, 1987); other studies provide experimental evidence on the influence of emotions on how people
price products (Lerner et al., 2004) and on their attitudes related to trust (Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005).
4Eliciting subjects’ mood after a movie is not a novel methodology for experimental psychologists. Andrade
(2005) and Andrade and Ariely (2009) exposed participants to a 5 minutes clip followed by a task in which they
were asked to describe a personal experience related to the movie; differently from this setting, their participants
were assigned to angry or a happy affect-inducing treatments. Västfjall et al. (2008) find that the affect elicited
by reminding a Swedish undergraduates about the 2004 tsunami disaster negatively influences their judgments of
well-being, future optimistic thinking and risk perceptions. Importantly, they assume that recalling the tsunami
automatically induces negative feelings; this, however, may not be always the case if victims’ social preferences
are positively affected by solidarity under the form of recovery aid (Becchetti et al., 2012). The emotional
responses to a video clip can be of many types as the results from this paper suggest and often not exogenous
to experimental behavior. For instance, Galasso et al. (2013) find heterogenous effects of informational video-
treatments on formal childcare on 1500 Italian women’s intended labor supply. For this reason, the before/after
video design implemented in this study is also capable to capture positive, neutral and negative moods induced
by the exposition to all subjects to the same tsunami-recalling clip and - differently from Västfjall et al. (2008)
and Galasso et al. (2013) - to address potential bias deriving from non-exogenous emotional responses to it.
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money the trustee would return in order not to make the trustor feel cheated (expected cheating
threshold). Such a modification allows for the identification of how different emotional responses
to a videoclip influence two original behavioral outcomes, namely the trustor’s propensity to
show a “less demanding” cheating notion and the trustee’s propensity to “cheat intentionally”,
i.e. the probability the former has a cheating notion corresponding to a non-negative return
on in investment (i.e. receiving no more than the amount sent in order not to feel cheated)
and the probability the latter returns no less than the expected cheating threshold of the
counterpart (i.e. giving back at least what (s)he believes would make the trustor not to feel
cheated).5 The elicitation of such cheating thresholds is important since it allows to i) control
for a potential source of heterogeneity in individuals’ behavior in the trust game originating from
their implicit (and personal) notions of how the others should behave and ii) understand further
if and how the elicited cheating notions respond to emotional changes caused by environmental
shocks reproduced in the treatment. The elicitation of subjects’ cheating notion has been first
implemented by Butler et al. (2012) who shows in a lab-experiment involving Italian students
that both parties in a trust game have personal notions of cheating and that these notions are
determined by parentally-transmitted values. This paper builds on these findings by showing
that such cheating notions may not be deterministic if they vary in response to emotional stimuli
which in a real world are spread almost everywhere.6
Descriptive and econometric results provide evidence of a positive impact of recalling sol-
idarity on the probability of playing i) as “less demanding” trustors with a cheating notion
corresponding to a non-negative return of investment (i.e. receiving at least what invested in
order not to feel cheated) and ii) as “reliable” trustees by returning no less than the expected
cheating notion of the counterpart. Importantly, a significant effect of watching the tsunami
video on game behavior is found only when accounting for differential emotional responses to
the treatment. In fact, treated participants who mostly recall solidarity show a higher proba-
bility of having a cheating threshold not above the amount sent (returned) than those mostly
recalling the calamity itself and/or looting experiences. Such effects cancel out when consider-
ing the video exposure only, i.e. without taking into account the different emotional reactions
generated by it. If, on the one hand, selecting a sample of micro-finance borrowers may limit the
external validity of the results, it improves however on their causal interpretation since, on the
other, potential problems of unobserved heterogeneity (very common in the related literature)
are reduced by the implementation of a before/after treatment assignment described above and
5The positive-return rule hypothesis is in line with the assumption (not tested) by Berg et al. (1995) that
trustors feel cheated by a negative return on their investment (i.e. amount sent). Consistently with such return
rule of trusting, more recently Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) and Bohnet et al. (2008) in eliciting subjects’
betrayal aversion measure trustworthiness as the proportion of agents choosing the highest principal’s payoff-
yielding outcome. See also Butler et al. (2012) for a definition of cheating notions on the basis of personal return
on investment rules.
6Examples of direct emotion manipulation are - for instance - advertisement campaigns run by public or
private companies for their marketing strategy.
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through the implicit process of bank screening and/or self-selection which ensures that micro-
finance borrowers share most of the observable (and plausibly unobservable) characteristics (i.e.,
for instance, entrepreneurial skills, trustworthiness, etc.).
Under the assumption that the trust game replicates most of real-world investment decisions,
the main results from this paper may have important economic implications. First, they provide
experimental evidence that in post-disaster contexts characterized by asymmetric information
and incomplete contracts artificially-induced positive affect can foster the social or economic
transactions which would not take place because of the underlying risk of being cheated. Sec-
ond, if “[. . . ] affective shocks are ubiquitous [. . . ]” as argued by Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011)
this is even more so in contexts affected by a natural calamity in which villagers are likely to
be reminded about it - and therefore emotionally affected - on a regular basis in their everyday
life. Understating in what direction positive, negative or neutral emotions modify behavior in
socio-economic transactions (reproduced by the trust game) has important policy implications,
for instance, for national or international developing agencies working in post-disaster recon-
struction activities as well as for institutional actors involved in the qualitative and quantitative
improvement of local economic exchanges by fostering social capital. Third, if social capital is
positively associated with economic growth (Keefer and Knack, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001) and
can be harnessed also through emotion manipulation, investigating the hidden and belief-based
determinants of trust and trustworthiness can play an important role for the design of policies
aimed at fostering economic growth and development in vulnerable areas.7
The remainder of paper is divided into five sections. In the second a detailed description of
the research design is provided. In the third descriptive findings and results from non-parametric
tests on balancing properties and behavior in the trust game are reported. The fifth section
contains results and comments from the econometric analysis. The seventh section concludes
by discussing the socio-economic implication of the main findings.
2 Research Design
The following subsections report a description of the context, the sampling scheme, the
games implemented and the post-experimental survey. Notice that the research project is
composed by three parts, i.e in the order i) an experimental session composed by a trust and a
risky decision game, ii) a socio-demographic survey and iii) a final lottery game. The treatment
7The literature on the economic role of trust and trustworthiness is extremely vast. For instance, they are
deemed as “lubricants” (Arrow, 1974) of the socioeconomic system, substitutes of formal contracts (Becchetti
and Conzo, 2011), factors which significantly reduce transaction costs in socio-economic transactions by helping
to “enforce cooperative agreements in bilateral sequential exchanges” (Greig and Bohnet, 2008) and improve
quality of institutions (Putnam, 1993; La Porta et al., 1997), firm productivity (Chami and Fullenkamp, 2002)
as well as the development of interethnic economic relationships and therefore economic performance (Alesina et
al., 1999; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005).
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- described in more details below - is based on watching a tsunami-videoclip before/after the
decisions in the experimental session.
This paper focuses just on the outcomes of the trust game for two reasons, i.e. i) there are
no effects of the treatment/control assignment and the consequent emotional responses on the
behavior in the risky investment game8 and ii) the risky decision game implemented to elicit
time preferences is a very simplified version of standard games involving more sophisticated
procedures to depict the entire risk aversion curvature through variation in lottery’s payoffs
and probabilities. Hence participants’ choices in the risky decision and the lottery games can
be interpreted as rough proxies for risk and time preferences and are added as controls in the
regression analysis.
Translators were intensively trained on the questionnaire, the game and standard experimen-
tal rules until they reached a satisfactory level of comprehension before starting the fieldwork.
The experimental sheets for each game, the entire questionnaire and the English script of the
video are reported respectively in the Appendices A, B and C.
2.1 The context and the sampling scheme
The 2004 tsunami wave in Sri Lanka had devastating consequences. About two thirds of
the country’s coastline was damaged causing dramatic human (about 35,000 dead and 443,000
displaced people) and economic losses (24,000 boats, 11,000 businesses and 88,500 houses dam-
aged). At the same time, soon after the shock the individuals living in the most affected areas
were reached by recovery assistance programs run by several national and international organi-
zations and NGOs. In November 2011 a research team implemented a field experiment in Sri
Lanka with the support of local translators.
With respect to sampling, from a list of borrowers of a local micro-finance institution (Agro
Micro Finance, hereon AMF) 390 borrowers were randomly selected and stratified by tsunami-
victimization status9 with the assistance of the AMF staff who personally came to know about
the personal conditions of all borrowers soon after the calamity. Participants to the experiment
were selected from three villages located on the southern coast of Sri Lanka, i.e. Galle, Matara
and Hambantota. As outlined in the introduction, the limited external validity of results based
on a sample of micro-finance borrowers can be compensated by a stronger internal validity
in terms of their causal interpretation because of the reduced observed and likely unobserved
sample heterogeneity. The initial screening by AMF and/or the potential self-selection into
borrowing may reasonably reduce potential sample differences which may not be orthogonal to
social preferences and/or emotional responses.10
8Results are omitted for reasons of space and consistency with the main focus of the paper but are available
upon request.
9Note that after the data-cleaning the sample size reduced to 386 observations because 4 participants fail to
complete the entire interview process.
10As confirmed by AMF staff, the sample is not likely to be affected by post-tsunami migration since soon after
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2.2 The games and the survey
Selected borrowers were interviewed house-by-house simultaneously by two teams composed
by an academic researcher and a translator. They were told they could real money by partic-
ipating into a research project composed of three parts, i.e. an experimental session, a socio-
demographic survey and a final lottery game. As far as the experimental session is concerned,
two games were implemented, i.e. a trust game (TG) and a risky investment game (RG). The
two games were randomly alternated to avoid order effects. The TG is a standard and simple
game largely adopted in the experimental literature to elicit social preferences under the form of
trust and trustworthiness in an incentive compatible way (see, among others, Berg at al. 1995).
The game involves two players, a Trustor (TR) and a Trustee (TE).11 In this experiment, the
TG was conducted only for one single round and full anonymity condition was respected so that
no participants could know the counterpart’s identity or see the pool of participants involved
in the experiment. Both the TR and TE were endowed with 300 LKR (the equivalent of 5.74
e) and TR had to select the amount x to send to TE. The strategy method largely used in the
literature on trust games was implemented for trustees: TE received 3x and had to decide how
much of it to return to the TR for each possible TR choice. According to the standard rational-
utility theory, TR (TE)’s maximum payoff is reached by sending (returning) 0 LKR. Deviations
from this equilibrium are usually interpreted as measures of trust for TR and trustworthiness
for TE. Importantly, personal notions of cheating were elicited by asking the TR “what is the
minimum amount of money you would need to receive from the other player in order not to feel
cheated?”, and to the TE “what is the minimum amount of LKR you think you need to return
in order not to make the first player feel cheated?”.12
The RG provided a behavioral measure of risk aversion through a simple game which did not
require a high degree of participants’ and translators’ familiarity with numbers or probabilities.
This game was implemented in a different context also by Charness and Genicot (2009) and
Gneezy and Potters (1997) and is based on a single investment decision. In the experimental
design of this paper, each participant was endowed with 300 LKR and had to decide whether
keeping the money (option 1) or investing a fraction x of it in a risky asset with 50 percent
probability of success (option 2). The investment would pay 3x if successful but 0 if not with
the participant keeping all the uninvested units. The amount x can be interpreted as rough
proxy of risk aversion (the higher the investment, the less risk averse being the individual).
the calamity damaged (and, indirectly, non-damaged) individuals received incentives to stay under the form of
i) incoming flows of recovery aid and ii) concession of micro-loans at favorable conditions. AMF’s loan-portfolio
suffered severe losses because of the insolvency of tsunami-affected individuals; however, soon after the calamity
it was recapitalized in an effective way as the evidence provided by Becchetti and Castriota (2010, 2011) suggests.
11The wording was kept neutral in all games in order to avoid frame effects. For instance, the game was
never presented as “trust game”, but rather denominated “TG”. Roles were phrased as “player 1” and “player
2” respectively for TR and TE.
12First order beliefs (FOBs) for TR and TE - i.e. the amount expected from the other player - were also
elicited through money incentivized questions.
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At the end of the experimental session, participants were asked to answer to standard so-
ciodemographic and economic questions as well as to questions regarding their social attitudes,
the kind and intensity of the damage they received in the 2004 on seven dimensions (i.e. per-
sonal injuries, injuries to family members, damages to house, economic activity, buildings/assets,
working tools, raw materials) and of the recovery aid on eight dimensions (i.e. money, credit,
food, medicines, raw materials, working tools, consumption, other). Importantly, participants
were asked to select what the tsunami videoclip mostly reminded them about among three
possible experiences, i.e. solidarity, looting and the calamity itself. Each option was also asso-
ciated to evocative words referring to similar domains, i.e. respectively altruism/cooperation,
opportunism, tsunami/natural disaster (see the questionnaire in the Appendix B).
The final stage of the whole experiment consisted of a lottery game through which partici-
pants’ time preferences were elicited in a money-incentivized way. A simple approach similar to
that implemented by Andersen et al. (2008) and Cassar et al. (2011) was adopted. Specifically,
the respondent was told that jointly with other 390 local people (s)he would participate into a
real lottery in which, if selected, s(he) could win from 10,000 to 14,142 LKR. The participant
had to choose among two payment options, i.e. receiving a prize of 10,000 LKR after 2 months
from the interview date (option A) or receiving a prize of 10,000 LKR + x after 8 months (op-
tion B). Each participant repeated the choice for eight potential lotteries in which x in option
B was increased so to make the “patient” option more attractive.13 The switch point - namely,
the potential lottery number at which the participant switches from option A to option B - can
be interpreted as a measure of impatience.14
2.3 Treatment assignment: the video-clip on tsunami
As far as the treatment assignment is concerned, each participant was showed a two minutes
video consisting of visual and auditive description (i.e. images and a background voice) about
the calamity and flows of the recovery aid received after the shock.15 The source of exogenous
variation in the emotional responses accounting for game decisions derives from the timing of
the treatment assignment: half of the sample was randomly selected to watch the clip before
starting the experimental section (i.e. before they actually could make decisions in the games)
and the other half of the sample did it soon after the experimental part but before the survey
13Note that in a preliminary version of the experiment a more complex experimental scheme was designed to
elicit risk and time preferences by using an approach more closely related to Andersen et al. (2008) and Holt and
Laury (2002). Once in the field, I instead opted for the simpler one described above, thus sacrificing complete-
ness/complexity for an adequate level of comprehension for both translators and participants. Consequently,
more reliable data were collected since with the original framework each interview process would have lasted
for more than two hours and a half with the risk of generating non reliable answers (because of the high stress
induced to translators and participants).
14More specifically, the later (sooner) the switch from option A to B - i.e. the higher (lower) the switch number
- the more (less) participants were considered as impatient.
15The video is available at the following link: https://www.dropbox.com/s/8fgtfsl53ykroxq/Sri%20Lanka%
201.mov. An English version of the script is reported in the Appendix C.
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(i.e. after they took decisions in the games). Hereon the former is considered as treatment
group and the latter as control.
Such a before-after treatment design allows to isolate and control for possible non-random
personal unobserved characteristics which can influence either emotional responses to the video
(i.e. answers to the question about what the video mostly reminded of) or decisions in the
games or both. In particular by controlling for emotional responses before and after the game
it is possible to account for potential group-heterogeneous traits which might bias the main
findings. However, as outlined in the next sections, participants do not significantly differ in
terms of observable characteristics when compared by their emotional responses to the video
exposure.
2.4 The protocol
At the beginning of the interview, the participant was told about the sequence of the in-
terview process, i.e. an experimental session composed of two games, a survey and a final
lottery. (S)he was informed that (s)he would be paid just for one randomly extracted game.
The game was extracted before (s)he played so that her/his decisions in the game could not
affect game-selection for payment.
As far as the TG is concerned, the participant was told that, if that game would be extracted
for payment, (s)he could earn real money (up to 1200 LKR) according to her/his own or the
matched counterpart’s choices in the game. The game was explained and the participant was
informed about her/his role, i.e. TR or TE. Then the game started and the participant reported
her/his choices. If the participant was chosen to be a TE, the strategy method described above
was implemented by asking him/her how much s(he) would return to the TR for each possible
TR’s send-choices (i.e. 30, 60, . . . , 300 LKR) considering that each possible TR’s amount sent
would be tripled before getting to the TE. If the participant was chosen to be a TR, (s)he was
asked how much of the endowment (300 LKR) (s)he would send to the TE knowing that it
would be tripled and that the TE could choose to return some or no money back. For both
players personal cheating notions were finally elicited through the questions mentioned above.16
The protocol was similar for the RG. Participants were told they could earn up to 900 LKR
(if the RG was selected for payment) depending on their choice and the outcome of a fair coin
that would be tossed at the end of the whole interview. Then the game was explained and the
participant made his/her decision. When the experimental session ended, the socio-demographic
survey was delivered and, finally, the lottery game was implemented as described above.
Note that if the participant was assigned to the treatment group, (s)he watched a video on
the interviewer’s laptop before playing the trust and the risky decision games. If, instead, (s)he
was assigned to the control group, the video was showed after the participants played the TG
16Players’ FOBs were elicited and 50 LKR paid for a correct guess.
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and RG but before the survey and the lottery game.
2.5 Game payments
At the end of the final lottery game the interviewer opened the envelope containing the game
extracted for payment. If the game was the RG, s(he) tossed the coin and payed the subject
according to her/his choice if (s)he opted for option 2; we payed 300 LKR otherwise.
If the game selected for payment was the TG, to make the payment feasible the research
teams exchanged MMS messages containing a photograph of their player’s TG answer sheet.
The TR was showed the answers of the matched TE on the researcher’s mobile phone which
were collected and sent by the researcher of the other team. The TR was then payed according
the amount (s)he sent and the corresponding TE’s return-choice for that amount. Similarly, the
TE was showed a photograph of the answer sheet of the matched TR and paid accordingly. The
TE’s and TR’s final payoff was calculated considering also their remaining game endowments
plus a participation fee of 200 LKR.17
As far as the payment for the lottery is concerned, participants were informed that when
all the other interviews were finished, researchers would extract one out of all the names of the
people interviewed; the lucky person would be the only winner of the lottery. Then, researchers
would extract from another urn a number from 1 to 8 and pay the winner only according to
his/her choice in the potential lottery number equal to the extracted one.18
Despite the potential interviewer-bias due to the presence of a translator, truthful reporting
is ensured by the large amount at stake given participants’ standards of living. Even ignoring
the payment from the lottery, the maximum payoff from the RG game for instance (900 LKR)
represents in the sample about 51 percent of the median per capita monthly food expenditure;
the percentage is even higher for the TG where the maximum payoff is 1200 LKR.19
3 Descriptive analysis
For the sake of clarity, Table 1 reports a detailed explanation of all the variables used in the
descriptive and econometric analyses.
17This procedure guaranteed anonymity to a greater extent than lab experiments where participants can
usually see the pool of potential players they would be matched with. However, since answers can be seen by
the interviewer, participants may also think they can be manipulated before reaching the counterpart in order to
make payments more advantageous to the experimenters. Such potentially confounding belief can be captured
by answers to the general trust questions which, when used as controls in the main regression analysis, do not
significantly explain behavior in the TG. Moreover, since in this study groups of individuals are compared on the
basis of a common exposure to a treatment and on their reactions to it, such a bias if present would affect all
groups indistinctly so that the observed differences in behavior cannot be fully explained by it.
18For example, if the number selected was 5, researchers payed the winner the amount corresponding to
his/her choice in lottery 5. If the winner in lottery 5 chose to receive “10,000 after two months”, researchers
would transfer that amount through Western Union after two months from his/her interview date.
19Even if the presence of translators would have influenced participants’ reported decisions, this potential
confounder does not fully capture the different behavior in the game between treated/non treated participants
since all of them would be exposed to the same source of bias.
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Insert Table 1 about here
In the following subsections the sample socio-demographic characteristics are commented
jointly with the results about the satisfaction of balancing properties on emotions and assign-
ment to the video treatment. Then subjects’ differential behavior in the trust game is illustrated
according to their emotional reactions, to assignment to the video before/after playing and to
both.
The maintained hypotheses in the descriptive and econometric analysis can be summarized
as follows:
- Hypothesis 1 : individuals are emotionally affected by the video in different ways, i.e.
positively (by recalling solidarity), negatively (by recalling looting) and neutrally (by recalling
just the calamity experience itself);
- Hypothesis 2 : on the basis of their heterogeneous emotional reactions, treated participants
respond differently in the trust game, i.e. positive (negative and/or neutral) affect induced by
the clip increases (decreases) the probability that:
1. trustors have a “less demanding” cheating threshold corresponding to a non-negative
return on investment rule, i.e. receiving no more than the amount invested in order not
to feel cheated;
2. trustees play “reliably” by returning at least what they believe the trustors would receive
in order not to feel cheated.
- Hypothesis 3 : given the structure of the experimental design, no significant effects of emotional
responses are observed in the control group on trustors’ and trustees’ game behavior.
3.1 Sample characteristics and balancing properties
The demographic statistics reported in Panel A of Table 2 show that participants have on
average 47 years, 4.5 household members and 10.5 years of schooling. The majority of them (83
percent) are married and slightly more than a half (54 percent) suffered from at least one type
of damage from the tsunami (variable Damaged) while about 35 percent received at least one
type of recovery assistance (variable Aid); 30 percent of the sample declares to have problems in
providing daily meals and most of them are employed in the trading and manufacturing sector
(37 and 32 percent respectively).
Insert Table 2 about here
As showed in Panel B of Table 2 most participants were reminded about solidarity (46
percent) while those recalling mostly looting and the calamity experience are respectively 29
and 25 percent of the sample. Such a difference confirms the first hypothesis since - because
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of observable or unobservable personal traits or experiences - people respond in emotionally
different ways even if exposed to the same stimulus.20
Panel C of Table 2 documents that almost 70 percent of participants are relatively impatient
and, on average, 60 percent of the amount at disposal is invested in the risky option (variable
Riskloving). Consistently with many trust game outcomes in the experimental literature, on av-
erage trustors sent about one third or their initial endowment; the trustees returned an amount
(averaged over all the strategy choices) corresponding to 20 percent of the tripled maximum
amount the trustor could send (variable Mean Return). As far as the cheating thresholds are
concerned, in order not to feel cheated trustors need to receive on average 30 percent more than
the mean amount sent –the difference in absolute terms between the average trustor’s contribu-
tion (variable Send) and the average trustor’s cheating threshold (variable TR cheat) is 41.61
LKR. Trustees on average believe that the trustors’ cheating notion corresponds to receiving
at least 173.26 LKR (variable TE cheat), i.e. 13 percent higher than the actual average TR’s
cheating threshold but 5 percent lower than the average TE’s return choice. Interestingly, the
average fraction of “less demanding” trustors defining a cheating notion according to a non-
negative return on investment rule (i.e. with a cheating threshold at least equal to the amount
invested - variable Pr(TR cheat ≤ Send)) is 40 percent while “reliable” trustees are on average
50 percent (i.e. those returning on average no less than their expected TR’s cheating threshold
- variable Avg Pr(Return ≥ TE cheat))21.
Table 3 report results from non-parametric tests on satisfaction of the balancing property
on treatment assignment (Panel A) and emotional reaction to the video (Panel B). Under
both comparisons individuals are not significantly different at 5 percent level on most of their
observable sociodemographic characteristics.22 This finding - also confirmed in the econometric
analysis - further ensure the causal interpretation of the role of video-induced emotions on the
behavior in the game.
Insert Table 3 about here
20This is the reason why only one video-treatment was implemented (and differential emotional reactions to it
were elicited) instead of exposing subjects to different video-treatments. In the latter case the chance of having
differential (uncontrolled) emotional responses would have been higher - as the evidence by Galasso et al. (2013)
would suggest - and therefore not helpful for a causal interpretation of the impact of emotions on game behavior.
21Note that the variable Avg Pr(Return ≥ TE cheat) has been built by generating an indicator equal to one
whenever TE returned in each strategy choice no less than the expected TR’s cheating threshold (i.e. variable
Pr(Return ≥ TE cheat)); then the indicator has been averaged over all the eleven TE’s choices so to have the
TE’s mean (strategic) propensity to play as a “reliable agent”.
22The only variables on which the confronted groups are statistically different at 5 percent significance level
are i) the village dummies in comparisons by treatment assignment and ii) schooling years and Problems meal in
comparisons by emotional reactions. Arguably, this may not represent a bias in the estimates since i) all these
variables are controlled for in the regression analysis, ii) the magnitude of the difference on schooling years by
emotional responses is not large (i.e. just one year) and iii) the before/after treatment emotional response (variable
recall solidarity) is accounted for in the regression analysis. With this last check the potential endogeneity of the
“recall” variables to game behavior is controlled for.
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As a further robustness check, the previous tests are repeated by comparing sample char-
acteristics by emotional responses separately for those who watched the video before playing
the game (treatment group) and for those who did it after (control group). Results are re-
ported respectively in Panel A and B of Table 4 and confirm the previous findings. A part from
schooling years and the number of household components for which the difference in magnitude
is very small, treated subjects - when compared by emotional responses - are similar on most
observable (and, likely, unobservable) characteristics. Similarly, control participants do not sta-
tistically differ in terms of their emotional reactions on most of the characteristics considered
so far.
Insert Table 4 about here
Incidentally, under these previous preliminary tests treated and non treated participants do
not show significant differences on their tsunami damage status (variable Damaged) nor the aid
received (variable Aid). Moreover, no significant differences are found when comparing them by
emotional reactions. Tables 3 and 4 also show risk attitudes do not significantly differ by video
or emotional responses (variable Riskloving) while - as showed below - trust game variables do
change in response to the treatment. For this reason, as outlined before, the rest of the analysis
concentrates on the behavioral variations in the trust game and use risk (and time) attitudes
as controls.23
3.2 Behavior in the TG by treatment and emotions
Non-parametric tests are implemented to check whether trust game behavior was affected
either by the treatment or by emotional reactions or by both. Results are reported in Table
5 where answers in the TG are compared separately by the treatment assignment (Panel A)
and the emotional responses to the video (Panel B). They are finally compared by emotional
responses restricting the sample alternatively to the treated (Panel C) and to non-treated (Panel
D) only.
Insert Table 5 about here.
Results from the non-parametric tests reported in Table 5 suggest in general that the video
treatment was effective in altering decisions in the TG only by inducing different affect in those
exposed to the video before playing the game.
23This secondary finding - also confirmed in the following econometric analysis - is based on field data collected
seven years after the calamity and hence does not necessarily contradict the hypothesis that the shock may have
affected subjects’ preferences few years after the event as showed by Callen et al. (2010) or by Cassar et al. (2011).
It however documents that in a longer run perspective such an effect is not present in this study. Moreover, as
suggested by Becchetti and Castriota (2010, 2011) tsunami-damaged villagers seem to have converged almost
fully to non-damaged ones in terms of objective and subjective well-being after the calamity.
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First, the treatment looks ineffective in altering TG behavior (Panel A) when the emotional
reactions induced by it are not considered, whereas the latter per se do not explain much
of the TG behavior (Panel B) when the treatment effect is not considered. Therefore, the
only comparison under which one should expect a statistically significant change in the TG
behavior is the one in which treated subjects are confronted by their emotional reactions while
no significant changes in the TG should be observed when looking at the non-treated. This is
actually the case as suggested by the results in Panels C-D of Table 5 which provide preliminary
support to the third hypothesis.
Second, the game variables significantly affected by the treatment and emotions are the
proportion of “less demanding” trustors and the proportion of “reliable” trustees which are
in both cases higher for treated participants recalling solidarity –see variables Pr(TR cheat ≤
Send) and Avg Pr(Return ≥ TE cheat) in the Panel C of Table 5. In particular, when recalling
solidarity the treated trustors are 22 percent more likely to expect no more than what invested
in order not to feel cheated than when recalling looting or the calamity. Similarly, treated
trustees are 12 percent more likely to return an amount of money larger than (or equal to)
what they believe the trustor should receive in order not to feel cheated when the video mostly
reminded them about solidarity than when about looting or the calamity.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Kernel density of the ratio between the trustors’ cheating thresholds (variable TR cheat)
and the amount they invest (variable Send) by treatment and emotional responses split are
reported in Figure 1. They confirm the preliminary findings on the differential impact of emo-
tional reactions on treated TR’s cheating notions defined according to a non-negative return on
investment rule. In particular, the treatment was effective in generating a differential impact
of emotions on game behavior as documented by the different distribution of TR cheatSend for those
recalling solidarity vs. those recalling looting or the calamity when the video is showed before
they play. In other terms, the proportion of treated trustors with less demanding cheating
notions (i.e. TR cheatSend ≤ 1) is higher when they recall solidarity than when they recall looting
and/or the calamity; in the latter case they tend to prefer a more demanding cheating notion
(i.e. TR cheatSend > 1). The distributions statistically differ by emotional reactions only in the
treated sample as confirmed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions test (p-value
= 0.012); as expected they do not in the control group (p-value = 0.870).
Insert Figure 2 about here
When considering the kernel density of trustees’ returned amounts (variable Return) over
what they believe trustors would need to receive in order not to feel cheated (variable TE cheat),
also in this case the video was effective since the proportion of treated trustees returning no
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less than their counterpart’s expected cheating thresholds (i.e. ReturnTE cheat ≥ 1) is higher when
recalling solidarity then when recalling looting or the calamity experience (see Figure 2). The
distributions are statistically different in treated sample but as expected they are not in the
control one (p-value of Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions test = 0.002 for treated
participants while p-value = 0.599 for control ones).24
Insert Figure 3 about here
Overall also the second hypothesis seems to be confirmed as documented by these prelim-
inary results. The positive affect from recalling solidarity in the tsunami video increases the
treated trustors’ (trustees’) propensity to behave in the TG as “less demanding” (“reliable”)
agents: relative to recalling looting or the calamity experience, recalling solidarity increases the
probability that i) trustors expect back no more than what invested and ii) trustees return at
least what - in their opinion - would satisfy trustors’ cheating notion.
4 Econometric analysis
This section reports an econometric validation of the preliminary findings regarding the
positive effects of recalling solidarity on the propensity to play as “less demanding” trustors
and “reliable” trustee when accounting for i) potential endogeneity in emotional responses, ii)
time and risk preferences and iii) differences in sociodemographic and economic characteristics
of the sample.
4.1 Description of the model
As showed in equation 1, the estimated model for trustors is a standard probit in which the
dependent variable is their propensity to define a “less demanding” cheating notion consistently
with a non-negative return on investment rule (i.e. they would need to receive no more than
what invested in order not to feel cheated):
Pr(TR cheat ≤ Send)i = αi + β1 V ideoi + β2Recall solidarityi+












24One might argue that - because of the implementation of the strategy method - the trustee’s expectation
about the counterpart’s cheating threshold maybe based on his/her first order beliefs (FOB), i.e. on what (s)he
actually expects the trustor to have sent. For this reason, Figure 3 reports the kernel density of Return
TE cheat
restricted
to cases in which TR Send is equal to the trustee’s FOB; thus, the Return variable considers in this case only
the trustee’s return choice in response to the TR’s possible contribution (TR Send) equal to what s(he) actually
believes the trustor has sent to him/her (FOB). The preliminary results from the more general case commented
above (Figure 2) are confirmed also under this further restriction (see Figure 3). Note that players’ FOB will be
also controlled for through a robustness check in the econometric analysis.
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For each trustor i, Video and Recalling solidarity are indicators respectively for the treatment
assignment (equal to one if (s)he watched the video before playing in the TG) and the emo-
tional response (equal to one if (s)he mostly recalled solidarity and zero if looting and/or the
calamity). The interaction between these two indicators captures the impact of the emotional
responses on TG behavior for the treated while the recalling solidarity dummy partials out the
potential unobserved heterogeneity between those recalling solidarity (positive affect) and those
recalling looting or the calamity (negative or neutral affect). TC are two dummies controlling
for the tsunami damage/non-damage status (variable Damaged) and whether the individual
received at least one type of recovery assistance after the calamity (variable Aid). GC are
two behavioral proxies for time (variable Riskloving) and risk preferences (variable Impatient)
elicited in the RG and the lottery game. DC is a set of standard controls for individual’s so-
ciodemographic and economic characteristics including age, gender, years of education, village
dummies, marital status dummies, household’s monthly food expenditure (Food exp std) plus a
dummy capturing poor economic conditions (Problems meal), the number of household’s com-
ponents (N house members), a proxy for social preferences (Trustindex ) and for involvement in
social activities (Sociability), a variable measuring borrower’s seniority (i.e. the number of loan
cycles - variable Loancycle) plus three dummies for the respondent’s working activity (Trading,
Fishery and Manufacturing).
The estimated model for trustees is a standard probit similar to that in eq. 1. To exploit
information from the full strategy of trustees, the dependent is now the TE’s propensity to
respond “reliably” to each possible amount the trustor can send consistently with his/her ex-
pected TR cheating threshold. In particular, the full model can be described by the following
equation:
Pr(Return ≥ TE cheat)ij = αij + β1V ideoij + β2Recall solidarityij+










DCm,ij + φTR sendij + εij
(2)
For any i-trustee an indicator variable named Pr(Return ≥ TE cheat) is defined as being
equal to one if, for each j-amount the trustor can send, (s)he returns (Return) at least what
(s)he believes the trustor should receive in order not to feel cheated (TE cheat). To control for
the changes in TE’s returned money due to the increasing amount of the TR possible options,
a variable equal to the jh-possible TR’s contribution (i.e. 30, 60, . . . , or 300) is introduced
(TR send). Since the sample is now composed by 193 trustees and 11 possible TR choices (i.e.
j=11) with a total of 2,123 observations, when estimating eq. 2 standard errors have been
clustered at the individual level.
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Equations 1 and 2 are estimated under different specifications by introducing stepwise the
above-mentioned controls and also by restricting the sample only to the treated or to the non-
treated participants. Econometric results are report and comment first for the sample of trustors
and then for that of the trustees.
4.2 Estimation results: Trustors
Estimation results for the sample of trustors generally confirm the ones from the previous
descriptive analysis and are reported in Table 6. The first column documents that - without
accounting for the different emotional variation induced - the video treatment alone does not
significantly explain any variation in the propensity of playing as a “less demanding” trustors.
In the second column the treatment seems to increase this propensity only for those who recall
solidarity relatively to those who recall looting or the calamity. This effect is robust to the
introduction of tsunami (column 3) and game (column 4) controls.
Insert Table 6 about here.
To test for the robustness of this finding, the specification in column 4 is re-estimated
separately for the treatment (column 5) and the control group (column 6). Results show that
positive affect (recalling solidarity) for the treated increases their propensity to have cheating
thresholds not above their investment of about 30 percent more than the negative/neutral affect
(recalling looting/calamity) (variable Recall solidarity, column 5). As expected, positive affect
does not significantly explain such propensity when the video is showed after playing (column
6).
As a further robustness check all the sociodemographic and economic controls mentioned
above are introduced. Estimations results are reported in columns 7-9 and confirm the positive
impact of recalling solidarity on the propensity for treated trustors to choose a “less demanding”
cheating rule. Notice that the variable Recall solidarity in columns 2, 4, 6 and 7 captures the
potential unobservable endogeneity due to non-random emotional responses to the video; since
it is statistically insignificant in all specifications, a channel from the video to the emotional
reaction and from the latter to the TR propensity to send more than (or the same as) the
personal cheating threshold exists and can be interpreted in a causal way.
As pointed out by Ai and Norton (2004), for a correct interpretation of the interaction effect
in non-linear models it is necessary to compute a different formula to that used for linear models.
Specifically, the full interaction effect in non-linear models is the cross-partial derivative of the
expected value of the dependent variable. By using an ad-hoc Stata package to compute the
interaction effect according to suggested procedure (i.e. inteff, see Norton et al., 2004), the
mean effect of Video*Recall solidarity is estimated to be .31 for the full model (i.e. that in
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column 7, Table 6) with a z -stat equal to 2.033 and .38 for the model with only game controls
(i.e. that in column 4, Table 6) with a z -stat equal to 2.651.
4.3 Estimation results: Trustees
Estimation results for the sample of trustees confirm the preliminary descriptive findings
and are reported in Table 7. In particular, a significant effect of the treatment on trustees’
propensity to respond “reliably” - given their expected TR cheating threshold - is found only
through the positive affect induced by recalling solidarity.
Insert Table 7 about here.
Specifically, the interaction between the treatment and the positive affect (variable Video
* Recall solidarity) is significant and positive in column 3 and robust to the introduction of
tsunami (column 4), game (column 5) and sociodemographic controls (column 9). When re-
stricting the sample to the treatment (columns 5 and 10) and control group (columns 6 and 11),
the positive emotional effect is significant only for the former while - as expected - it is not for
the latter. In particular, the treated trustees’ propensity to respond “reliably” rises of about 20
percent more if they mostly recall solidarity than if they mostly recall looting and/or calamity.
In addition, since such propensity is increasing in the TR’s possible send-choices (variable
TR Send), by exploiting the information on TE strategy collected through the strategy method
one can test whether the positive emotional effect is harnessed for high (above 210 LKR) or
low (below or equal to 210 LKR) possible TR contributions. Findings are reported in columns
7-8 (12-13) without (when) introducing socio-demographic controls and clearly show that the
positive emotional effect is significant only for high trustor’s possible contributions. This effect
can be due to positive reciprocity of trustees who feel morally or socially obliged to reward acts
of trust when these correspond to large amounts (see, among others, Fehr and Gächter, 1998,
McCabe at al., 2003, Greig and Bohnet, 2008).
Importantly, notice that also trustee’s estimates do not report evidence of potential endo-
geneity in emotion reaction since the variable Recall solidarity is insignificant in all the spec-
ifications where the treatment (Video) and the interaction term (Video*Recall solidarity) are
present (columns 2-4, 7-9, 12-13).25
Similarly to what done for trustors, by using the above-mentioned Stata package to compute
the correct interaction effect (Norton et al., 2004), the mean effect of Video*Recall solidarity is
estimated to be .14 for the specification in column 4 (Table 7) with a z -stat equal to 1.850 and
.20 for that in column 8 (Table 7) with a z -stat equal to 2.039.
25In order to control for trustee’s expectations about the trustor’s contribution, each specification is augmented
with the trustee’s FOBs and the main findings do not change. Results are robust also to i) the introduction of
trustor’s FOBs in those specifications regarding the sample of trustors and ii) the introduction of an additional
interaction term Video*Damaged both in the sample of trustors and of trustees. Estimation results from all these
robustness checks are omitted for reasons of space but available upon request.
18
5 Discussion
The importance of emotions is not a novel discovery for the psychological literature (see, for
instance, Isen et al., 1976). Emotions are recently becoming a relevant topic also for economists
interested in testing the effect of individuals’ mood on their socio-economic decisions (see, among
others, Elster, 1998, Loewenstein, 2000, Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003, Kirchsteiger et al., 2006,
Oswald et al., 2008, Lerner, et al., 2004, Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005, Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2011
and Västfjall et al., 2008). Reasonably, affective shocks - even if temporary - are everywhere
and depending on their intensity they may influence the way people take decisions (Cohen and
Andrade, 2004 and Wegener and Petty, 1995).
People may often respond differently to the same emotional stimulus on the basis of personal
subjective (and, likely, unconscious) traits which are not always observable to the econometri-
cian. For instance, inhabitants of an area exposed to an unexpected natural disaster might be
subject to continuous incidental emotional states deriving from the external environment (i.e.,
for instance, when looking at broken roads, damaged houses, injured relatives, etc.). Such states
can be in turn affected by different memories of the past shock to which affected/non-affected
people can react in a very specific way depending on their personal traits and/or experiences.
Most of the lab-experiments using films to artificially induce moods do not fully take into ac-
count the possibility that individuals’ emotional responses after a film can go to different (or
even opposite) directions. Back to the previous example, this maybe the case of individuals
exposed to a past natural shock which - when reminded about it - can be affected in their be-
havior by positive, negative or neutral moods depending, for instance, on whether they mostly
recall experiences of solidarity, looting or just the calamity itself. Evidence of heterogenous
reactions to a common informational video-treatment is provided, among others, by Galasso et
al. (2013).
What is the impact of different emotional states on decisions is still an open question, es-
pecially for what concerns inhabitants exposed to violent natural or manmade shocks in the
past. In this respect there is a growing strand of the experimental literature in development
economics which focuses on the direct impact of these shocks on affected/non-affected individ-
uals’ preferences, i.e. for instance trust and cooperation (Becchetti et al., 2014, Cassar et al.,
2011 and 2013, Cameron and Shah, 2011, Whitt and Wilson, 2007, Fleming et al., 2011), time
and risk attitudes (Callen, 2010, Eckel et al. 2009, Voors et al., 2012, Willinger et al., 2013),
altruism (Becchetti et al., 2012), etc. To my knowledge, there are no current studies testing
if and how people exposed to a past calamity modify their social behavior when their mood is
manipulated through a video refreshing the shock experience.
To investigate the nexus between positive affect and the probability of playing as “less de-
manding” trustors and “reliable” trustees, I conducted a random-assignment experiment on
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a sample of micro-finance Sri Lankan borrowers affected/non-affected by the 2004-tsunami in
which personal cheating notions are elicited (as in Butler et al., 2012) after artificially manipu-
lating subjects’ mood. All subjects watched a short videoclip on the 2004-tsunami; half of them
were randomly assigned to watch it before (treatment group) while the remaining to watch it
after (control group) playing the trust game. In a post-experimental survey information on
which direction subjects’ mood was altered were collected by asking whether the video mostly
reminded them about solidarity (positive affect), looting or the calamity experience (negative
or neutral affect).
Even controlling for direct tsunami effects in terms of damages and aid received (which
turns out to be not significant), the experimental results document a differential impact of
the emotional responses generated by the video on the propensity to play as “less demanding”
trustors and “reliable” trustees according to own personal cheating notions. In particular, the
probability for trustors to define cheating as a non-negative return on investment (i.e. receiving
no more than what invested in order not to feel cheated) and for trustee to satisfy trustor’s
expected cheating notion (i.e. returning at least what would make him/her not feel cheated)
is higher for those who recall solidarity than for those recalling looting and/or the calamity.
Artificially-induced positive emotions increase the fraction of trustors less demanding in terms
of cheating and of non-intentionally cheating trustees respectively by about 30 and 20 percent
more than do artificially induced negative or neutral emotions.
Despite of the possible limited external validity of the results due to sample composition
(i.e. micro-finance borrowers from three Sri Lankan villages), the specific design of this study
leads to findings which are very likely to be interpreted in a causal way for at least two main
reasons. First, as confirmed in the descriptive and econometric analysis, the before/after video
assignment allows to control for potential endogenous unobserved traits influencing emotional
reactions and game behavior. Second, the process of bank screening and/or self-selection of
eligible borrowers is likely to ensure that the current micro-finance borrowers share most of
the observable and plausibly unobservable characteristics (i.e., for instance, entrepreneurial
attitudes, trustworthiness, etc.) which maybe correlated with emotions and behavior in the
trust game.
If the trust game replicates most of real-world investment decisions, the main findings may
have important economic implications. First, they suggest a new channel through which - in
a post-disaster environment with asymmetric information and incomplete contracts - positive
affect might stimulate engagement in market interactions which would not take place otherwise
because of the implicit risk of being cheated. Second, independently from whether incidental
emotions are the basis for future decisions (Andrade and Ariely, 2009) or their effect on behavior
decays soon, results from this paper are still relevant if affective shocks are ubiquitous (Ifcher
and Zarghamee, 2011). This is very likely to happen in contexts - as the one in this study
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- affected by a natural calamity in which people are frequently reminded about it in daily
activities and consequently more likely to think other neighbors exposed to the same emotional
stimuli will behave as they would do – they may perceive a sort of “falsus consensus” with
respect to their own emotions and choices and extrapolate their opponent’s behavior from their
own (see, among others, Ross et al. 1977, Butler et al., 2010 and Engelmann and Strobel,
2012). Understating in what direction positive, negative or neutral affect alter socio-economic
transactions may provide national or international developing agencies working in post-disaster
reconstruction with further insights on how to improve upon the efficacy of their activities.
If it provides further causal evidence about the role of emotions on trusting and trustworthy
behavior, this study alone is not certainly sufficient to suggest policy-makers, NGOs or pub-
lic/private companies how to exploit the nexus between moods and behavior to harness social
capital. Additional research on the topic is needed in at least two directions, i.e. i) the impact
of emotion manipulation in multi-round games where subjects can update their beliefs and ii)
the time-length necessary for incidental emotions to alter subjects’ behavior permanently or at
least for a longer time horizon.
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Table 1: Variable Legend
Variable Description
Send amount sent by the Trustor (TR)
TR cheat cheating threshold: amount of money S needs to receive back from R in order not to feel cheated
TE cheat expected cheating threshold: amount of money R needs to send back in order not to make S feel cheated
Trustor = 1 if the player is a TR; = 0 if the player is a TE.
Return TE amount returned in response to each TR possible choice (strategy method)
Mean Return amount of money returned by TE (Return) averaged over all the 11 possible TR choices (strategy method)
Pr(TR cheat ≤ Send) proportion of TRs who define a cheating notion corresponding to a non-negative return on investment
rule, i.e. receiving no more than what invested in order not to feel cheated
Pr(Return ≥ TE cheat) proportion of TEs returning strictly more than what they expect the TR needs to receive in order not to
feel cheated
Pr(Return ≥ TE cheat) proportion of TEs returning equally to/more than what they expect the TR needs to receive in order not
to feel cheated
Avg Pr(Return ≥ TE cheat) proportion of TEs returning equally to/more than what they expect the TR needs to receive in order not
to feel cheated (averaged over the 11 retun choices)
Age respondent’s age
Male =1 if the respondent is male
Married =1 if the respondent is married
Widowed =1 if the respondent is widowed
Separated =1 if the respondent is separated
Single =1 if the respondent is single
N house members n. of house components
Years schooling respondent’s years of schooling
Food exp std monthly respondent’s household food expenditure (in LKR, scaled by 1000).
Agriculture = 1 if the respondent works in the agricultural sector
Manufacturing = 1 if the respondent works in the manufacturing sector
Fishery = 1 if the respondent works in the fishery sector
Trading = 1 if the respondent works in the trading sector
Riskloving amount invested in the risky option of the risky investment game.
Riskloving ratio amount invested in the risky option of the risky investment game / initial endowment (300 LKR).
Switch potential lottery number at which the participant switches from option A (receive 10.000 LKR after 2
months) to option B (receive 10.000 + x LKR after 8 months). It is a real number between 1 and 9; it is
=1 if the participant chooses B from the first potential lottery and never switches to A (maximum degree
of patience); it is =9 if the participant chooses A from the first potential lottery and never switches to
B (maximum degree of impatience). See relevant game sheets in the Appendix A for the options in each
single lottery.
Impatient = 1 if switch ¿ 5.9, i.e the respondent is above the mean level of impatience— (s)he has switched to option
B (highest payoff with latest payment) from or after the seventh lottery-choice. See relevant game sheets
in the Appendix A for the option list for each lottery.
Galle = 1 If the respondent lives in Galle district.
Matara = 1 If the respondent lives in Matara district.
Hambantota = 1 If the respondent lives in Hambantota district.
Most can be trusted ”Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in
dealing with people?”. 1 = Have to be careful ; 2 = Most people can be trusted.
Cant rely respondent’s 1-5 Likert scale agreement on the statement: ”Nowadays, you can’t rely on anybody”
People take advantage respondent’s 1-5 Likert scale agreement on the statement: ”If you are not careful, other people will take
advantage of you”
Trustindex (most can be trusted+cant rely+ people take advantage)/3
Loancycle total n. of loan repaid (borrower’s seniority)
Personal Injury =1 if the respondent reports personal injuries caused by tsunami
Family Injury =1 if the respondent reports injuries to relatives caused by tsunami
Damage house =1 if the respondent reports damages to the house caused by tsunami
Damage econ activity =1 if the respondent reports damages to the economic activity caused by tsunami
Damage assets =1 if the respondent reports damages to assets caused by tsunami
Damage tools =1 if the respondent reports damages to working tools caused by tsunami
Damage raw materials =1 if the respondent reports damages to raw materials caused by tsunami
Damaged =1 if the respondent reports at least one type of damage.
Money aid =1 if the respondent received financial aid (non microfinance) after the tsunami
Credit aid =1 if the respondent received financial support (microfinance) after the tsunami
Food aid =1 if the respondent received assistance in terms of food after the tsunami
Medicines aid =1 if the respondent received assistance in terms of medicines after the tsunami
Rawmaterials aid =1 if the respondent received assistance in terms of raw materials for repairing/rebuilding house after the
tsunami
Tools aid =1 if the respondent received assistance in terms of working tools after the tsunami
Consumption aid =1 if the respondent received consumption aid after the tsunami
Other aid =1 if the respondent received other kind of aid after the tsunami
Aid index = sum of * aid dummies /8
Aid = 1 if Helpindex ¿ 0
Problems meal = 1 if the respondent has problems in buying or providing daily meals
Video = 1 if the respondent has watched the video BEFORE the experimental session; = 0 if (s)he has watchad
it AFTER the experimental session.
Recall solidarity = 1 if the respondent through the video mostly recalled solidarity
Recall calamity = 1 if the respondent through the video mostly recalled the calamity
Recall looting = 1 if the respondent through the video mostly recalled looting
Sociability standardized index of ”sociability” = sum across all the groups the respondent belongs to (i.e. sporting,
neighbour, religious, community, cultural, NGOs, political, other) divided by 8 (tot. number of groups)
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Panel A - Sociodemographic characteristics
Age 386 46.93 12.189 12 71
Single 386 0.04 0.205 0 1
Widowed 386 0.10 0.298 0 1
Separated 386 0.02 0.134 0 1
Married 386 0.84 0.368 0 1
Male 386 0.07 0.255 0 1
Galle 386 0.21 0.410 0 1
Hambantota 386 0.28 0.452 0 1
Matara 386 0.50 0.501 0 1
Years schooling 379 10.53 2.499 0 16
Food exp std 385 8.74 6.907 0.4 120
N house members 386 4.52 1.413 1 10
Trading 386 0.37 0.484 0 1
Fishery 386 0.04 0.187 0 1
Manufacturing 386 0.32 0.466 0 1
Agriculture 386 0.22 0.415 0 1
Trustindex 384 1.21 0.339 0.667 2.667
Loancycle 386 2.05 3.203 0 28
Damaged 386 0.54 0.499 0 1
Aid 376 0.34 0.474 0 1
Problems meal 386 0.29 0.454 0 1
Sociability 378 0.34 0.154 0 0.875
Panel B - Treatment and Emotional Responses
Video 386 0.51 0.501 0 1
Recall solidarity 386 0.46 0.499 0 1
Recall calamity 386 0.29 0.453 0 1
Recall looting 386 0.25 0.436 0 1
Panel C - Behavior in the Game
Riskloving ratio 386 0.59 0.287 0 1
Switch 386 5.89 2.987 1 9
Impatient 386 0.69 0.461 0 1
Trustor 386 0.50 0.501 0 1
Send 193 112.07 55.093 0 300
Mean Return 193 182.74 75.314 14.545 568.182
TR cheat 193 153.68 72.172 30 490
TE cheat 192 173.26 92.869 6 900
Pr(TR cheat ≤ Send) 193 0.40 0.492 0 1
Avg Pr(Return ≥ TE cheat) 190 0.50 0.242 0 1
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Table 3: Balancing properties by treatment and emotions (full sample)
Panel A: Balancing prop. by video Panel B: Balancing prop. by emotions




Obs Mean Std dev Non-par
test (z, p)
Age
after 190 48.14 11.580 1.759 no 210 47.34 12.013 0.634
before 196 45.76 12.671 0.079 yes 176 46.44 12.412 0.526
Male
after 190 0.08 0.270 0.682 no 210 0.08 0.266 0.525
before 196 0.06 0.240 0.495 yes 176 0.06 0.243 0.600
Married
after 190 0.83 0.380 -0.687 no 210 0.86 0.351 1.037
before 196 0.85 0.356 0.492 yes 176 0.82 0.387 0.300
Separated
after 190 0.02 0.125 -0.340 no 210 0.01 0.097 -1.383
before 196 0.02 0.142 0.734 yes 176 0.03 0.167 0.167
Widowed
after 190 0.11 0.308 0.442 no 210 0.09 0.288 -0.573
before 196 0.09 0.290 0.658 yes 176 0.11 0.311 0.566
Single
after 190 0.05 0.224 0.809 no 210 0.04 0.203 -0.124
before 196 0.04 0.186 0.419 yes 176 0.05 0.209 0.902
N house members
after 190 4.58 1.338 1.218 no 210 4.60 1.367 0.996
before 196 4.46 1.483 0.223 yes 176 4.43 1.464 0.319
Years schooling
after 187 10.52 2.415 -0.190 no 206 10.11 2.577 -4.089
before 192 10.53 2.585 0.849 yes 173 11.02 2.313 0.000
Food exp std
after 190 8.59 3.825 0.898 no 209 9.13 8.697 0.729
before 195 8.88 8.951 0.369 yes 176 8.27 3.792 0.466
Agriculture
after 190 0.19 0.397 -1.187 no 210 0.22 0.415 -0.060
before 196 0.24 0.431 0.235 yes 176 0.22 0.417 0.952
Manufacturing
after 190 0.34 0.474 0.863 no 210 0.35 0.477 1.455
before 196 0.30 0.458 0.388 yes 176 0.28 0.449 0.146
Fishery
after 190 0.04 0.201 0.603 no 210 0.05 0.213 1.301
before 196 0.03 0.173 0.546 yes 176 0.02 0.149 0.193
Trading
after 190 0.41 0.492 1.287 no 210 0.37 0.484 -0.072
before 196 0.34 0.476 0.198 yes 176 0.38 0.486 0.942
Galle
after 190 0.17 0.375 -2.079 no 210 0.20 0.401 -0.652
before 196 0.26 0.437 0.038 yes 176 0.23 0.420 0.515
Matara
after 190 0.56 0.498 2.137 no 210 0.50 0.501 -0.315
before 196 0.45 0.499 0.033 yes 176 0.51 0.501 0.753
Hambantota
after 190 0.27 0.447 -0.483 no 210 0.30 0.461 0.940
before 196 0.30 0.458 0.629 yes 176 0.26 0.441 0.347
Switch
after 190 6.13 2.910 1.642 no 210 6.02 2.796 -0.217
before 196 5.66 3.050 0.101 yes 176 5.74 3.202 0.828
Impatient
after 190 0.66 0.476 1.343 no 210 0.66 0.476 1.594
before 196 0.60 0.491 0.179 yes 176 0.60 0.492 0.111
Riskloving
after 190 174.16 87.554 -0.946 no 210 178.57 75.037 -0.295
before 196 181.99 84.639 0.344 yes 176 177.61 97.828 0.768
Trustindex
after 189 1.20 0.365 -1.205 no 209 1.21 0.360 -0.844
before 195 1.21 0.313 0.228 yes 175 1.21 0.312 0.398
Recall solidarity
after 190 0.45 0.499 -0.333 no 210
before 196 0.46 0.500 0.739 yes 176
Damaged
after 190 0.55 0.499 0.534 no 210 0.55 0.498 0.581
before 196 0.53 0.501 0.594 yes 176 0.52 0.501 0.561
Aid
after 184 0.33 0.472 -0.250 no 204 0.34 0.474 0.021
before 192 0.34 0.476 0.802 yes 172 0.34 0.474 0.983
Sociability
after 186 0.34 0.145 1.208 no 202 0.34 0.164 0.062
before 192 0.33 0.162 0.227 yes 176 0.34 0.142 0.950
Problems meal after 190 0.28 0.450 -0.477 no 210 0.24 0.427 -2.459
before 196 0.30 0.460 0.633 yes 176 0.35 0.479 0.014
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Table 4: Balancing properties by emotions (treated vs. non-treated)
Panel A - Video Before Panel B - Video After
Variable Recall
solidarity
Obs Mean Std dev Non-par
test (z, p)
Obs Mean Std dev Non-par
test (z, p)
Age
no 105 46.05 12.652 0.369 104 48.56 11.272 0.552
yes 91 45.43 12.753 0.712 83 47.46 12.153 0.581
Male
no 105 0.06 0.233 -0.255 104 0.10 0.296 0.896
yes 91 0.07 0.250 0.798 83 0.06 0.239 0.370
Married
no 105 0.84 0.370 -0.589 104 0.88 0.332 2.061
yes 91 0.87 0.340 0.556 83 0.76 0.430 0.039
Separated
no 105 0.01 0.098 -1.155 104 0.01 0.098 -0.781
yes 91 0.03 0.180 0.248 83 0.02 0.154 0.435
Widowed
no 105 0.10 0.308 0.671 104 0.08 0.268 -1.483
yes 91 0.08 0.268 0.502 83 0.14 0.354 0.138
Single
no 105 0.05 0.214 0.962 104 0.04 0.193 -1.019
yes 91 0.02 0.147 0.336 83 0.07 0.261 0.308
N house members
no 105 4.70 1.481 2.073 104 4.48 1.238 -0.724
yes 91 4.19 1.445 0.038 83 4.67 1.458 0.469
Years schooling
no 104 9.90 2.594 -4.449 101 10.31 2.568 -1.455
yes 88 11.26 2.385 0.000 83 10.84 2.206 0.146
Food exp std
no 104 9.39 11.649 0.173 104 8.87 4.110 0.885
yes 91 8.30 4.095 0.863 83 8.26 3.501 0.376
Agriculture
no 105 0.24 0.428 -0.237 104 0.20 0.403 0.156
yes 91 0.25 0.437 0.812 83 0.19 0.397 0.876
Manufacturing
no 105 0.32 0.470 0.917 104 0.38 0.486 1.231
yes 91 0.26 0.443 0.359 83 0.29 0.456 0.218
Fishery
no 105 0.04 0.192 0.652 104 0.05 0.215 0.856
yes 91 0.02 0.147 0.515 83 0.02 0.154 0.392
Trading
no 105 0.37 0.486 0.936 104 0.38 0.486 -0.812
yes 91 0.31 0.464 0.349 83 0.43 0.499 0.417
Galle
no 105 0.26 0.439 0.070 104 0.14 0.353 -1.090
yes 91 0.25 0.437 0.944 83 0.20 0.406 0.276
Matara
no 105 0.44 0.499 -0.328 104 0.55 0.500 -0.248
yes 91 0.46 0.501 0.743 83 0.57 0.499 0.804
Hambantota
no 105 0.30 0.463 0.291 104 0.31 0.464 1.199
yes 91 0.29 0.454 0.771 83 0.23 0.423 0.231
Switch
no 105 5.60 2.884 -1.095 104 6.41 2.653 0.715
yes 91 5.74 3.245 0.273 83 5.71 3.206 0.475
Impatient
no 105 0.61 0.490 0.108 104 0.70 0.460 2.267
yes 91 0.59 0.494 0.914 83 0.59 0.495 0.023
Riskloving
no 105 180.57 74.302 -0.600 104 175.96 76.177 0.167
yes 91 183.63 95.586 0.549 83 170.60 100.150 0.867
Trustindex
no 104 1.20 0.340 -1.637 104 1.22 0.382 0.443
yes 91 1.23 0.280 0.102 82 1.19 0.348 0.658
Damaged
no 105 0.53 0.501 0.235 104 0.57 0.498 0.507
yes 91 0.52 0.502 0.814 83 0.53 0.502 0.612
Aid
no 102 0.36 0.483 0.588 102 0.31 0.466 -0.570
yes 90 0.32 0.470 0.556 82 0.35 0.481 0.568
Sociability
no 101 0.34 0.176 0.712 100 0.34 0.153 -0.789
yes 91 0.32 0.146 0.476 83 0.36 0.137 0.430
Problems meal no 190 0.28 0.450 -1.746 190 0.28 0.450 -1.716
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Probability of playing as a “less demanding” trustor
Pr(TR cheat ≤ Send) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Video Before Video After Full Sample Video Before Video After
Video -0.0165 -0.153 -0.190** -0.238** -0.266**
(0.0708) (0.0931) (0.0955) (0.0974) (0.104)
Recall solidarity -0.105 -0.0909 -0.135 0.267** -0.126 -0.153 0.356** -0.196*
(0.0985) (0.101) (0.103) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.145) (0.114)
Video*Recall solidarity 0.324** 0.328** 0.395*** 0.365**
(0.136) (0.138) (0.134) (0.146)
Damaged 0.0254 0.0440 0.161 -0.0752 0.0637 0.257* -0.0574
(0.0770) (0.0783) (0.109) (0.113) (0.0877) (0.138) (0.141)
Aid 0.0833 0.0790 -0.0284 0.218 0.129 -0.100 0.329*
(0.0864) (0.0893) (0.116) (0.135) (0.104) (0.169) (0.178)
Riskloving -0.122 -0.0538 -0.201 -0.174 -0.175 -0.186
(0.140) (0.189) (0.204) (0.144) (0.230) (0.230)
Impatient -0.216*** -0.307*** -0.102 -0.194** -0.396*** -0.220
(0.0792) (0.106) (0.120) (0.0871) (0.147) (0.151)
Male 0.320** 0.0891 0.488***
(0.146) (0.236) (0.168)








N house members -0.0177 0.0570 -0.0943**
(0.0307) (0.0547) (0.0447)
Food exp std -0.00730 -0.0329 -0.00354
(0.0112) (0.0225) (0.0171)
Problems meal -0.0567 -0.102 -0.0361
(0.0880) (0.146) (0.142)
Galle 0.0812 0.0198 0.235
(0.107) (0.146) (0.164)
Hambantota 0.0990 0.118 0.112
(0.111) (0.202) (0.161)
Years schooling 0.0167 0.0165 0.00486
(0.0183) (0.0379) (0.0254)
Trading 0.0339 0.169 -0.0484
(0.0892) (0.129) (0.139)
Agriculture 0.0612 -0.208 0.221
(0.122) (0.186) (0.162)
Manufacturing -0.0563 -0.0362 0.0128
(0.0887) (0.131) (0.153)
Loancycle -0.00917 -0.0466* -0.00985
(0.0105) (0.0245) (0.0138)
Trustindex 0.0992 -0.298 0.310
(0.125) (0.203) (0.194)
Sociability -0.227 -0.177 0.0554
(0.281) (0.385) (0.461)
Observations 193 193 187 187 94 93 181 89 89
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The reported coef-
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Figure 3. K-density of TE’s returned amounts over TR’s expected cheating notions
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NOT	  FOR	  PUBLICATION	  
	   1	  
APPENDIX	  A	  –	  GAME	  INSTRUCTIONS	  
	  
A.1	  INTRODUCTION	  
Hi,	  thanks	  for	  being	  here.	  You	  have	  already	  won	  200	  LKR	  just	  for	  participating.	  	  
Today	  we	  are	  going	  to	  play	  some	  games	  in	  which	  you	  can	  earn	  additional	  money	  depending	  on	  
how	  you	  play.	  So	   it	   is	   in	  your	   interest	   to	  put	  as	  much	  effort	  as	  possible	  and	  behave	   truthfully!	  
Please,	  do	  not	  talk	  with	  each	  other	  unless	  we	  tell	  you	  explicitly	  and	  take	  the	  games	  seriously.	  	  
You	   will	   play	   some	   games	   that	   replicate	   daily-­‐life	   situations.	   During	   the	   session,	   you	   will	   be	  
shown	  also	  a	  video.	  	  
The	  games	  may	  allow	  you	  to	  make	  positive	  payoffs.	  In	  addition	  to	  your	  show	  up	  fee	  of	  200	  LKR,	  
you	  can	  win	  up	  to	  900	  or	  1200	  LKR	  depending	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  game.	  You	  will	  be	  paid	  just	  
for	  one	  randomly	  selected	  game,	  so	  it	  is	  in	  your	  interest	  to	  put	  the	  same	  effort	  in	  each	  game	  since	  
you	  don't	  know	  which	  game	  is	  selected	  for	  payment.	  
We	  have	  already	  randomly	  selected	   the	  game	   for	  payment	   for	   this	   session.	   It	   is	  written	   in	   this	  
envelope.	   So	   your	   actions	   in	   the	   game	   won't	   influence	   the	   choice	   of	   the	   game	   selected	   for	  
payment.	  	  	  	  
You	  will	  be	  given	  the	  specific	   instruction	   for	  each	  game	  by	  an	  experimenter.	   In	  case	  of	  doubts,	  
please	  do	  not	  hesitate	  to	  ask	  him/her	  questions.	  Make	  sure	  you	  understand	  the	  games	  perfectly	  
and	  ask	  –	  if	  necessary	  –	  for	  more	  examples.	  	  
The	  whole	  session	  will	  end	  with	  a	  survey.	  	  
To	  sum	  up,	  your	  total	  earning	  will	  be	  equal	  to:	  show-­‐up	  fee	  +	  what	  you	  earn	  in	  one	  of	  the	  games	  





	  BEFORE	  OR	  AFTER	  THE	  GAMES	  	  	  
(see	  Appendix	  C)	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A.2	  INSTRUCTIONS	  -­‐	  GAME	  "TG"	  
Today	   you	   are	   given	   the	   chance	   to	   play	   and	   earn	   real	  money.	   In	   this	   game	   you	  will	   be	   asked	   some	  
questions	  and	  depending	  on	  how	  your	  and	  the	  other	  player's	  answers	  you	  may	  earn	  up	  to	  1200	  LKR	  
(or	  1200	  LKR	  depending	  on	  the	  role	  you	  play).	  	  	  
This	  game	   is	  based	  on	  an	  exchange	  of	  money	  between	   two	   individuals	  with	  anonymity,	   that	   is	   each	  
player	  does	  not	  know	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  other.	  You	  play	  with	  someone	  from	  your	  village	  and	  you	  do	  
not	  know	  his/her	  identity	  nor	  he/she	  knows	  yours.	  	  
The	  game	  involves	  two	  roles,	  i.e.	  player	  one	  and	  player	  two.	  You	  are	  randomly	  chosen	  to	  play	  just	  one	  
of	  these	  two.	  The	  other	  role	  is	  played	  by	  another	  person	  in	  this	  village.	  	  
We	   give	   to	   both	   of	   you	   300	   LKR.	   Player	   one	   has	   to	   choose	   how	  much	   of	   this	   amount	   to	   keep	   for	  
him/herself	  and	  how	  much	  to	  send	  to	  the	  other	  player.	  He/she	  can	  send	  from	  0	  to	  300	  LKR.	  Then	  we	  
take	  the	  sum	  he/she	  decided	  to	  send,	  multiply	  it	  by	  three	  and	  give	  it	  to	  the	  player	  two.	  	  
Player	   two	  has	   to	   decide	  how	  much	   to	   return	  back	   to	   the	   first	   player	   for	   each	  possible	   amount	   the	  
player	   one	   can	   send.	   The	   game	   ends	   and	   we	   match	   player-­‐one's	   decision	   with	   the	   corresponding	  
choice	  of	  player-­‐two.	  
Once	  you	  have	  finished	  this	  game,	  if	  this	  game	  is	  selected	  for	  payment	  your	  answers	  will	  be	  randomly	  
matched	  with	  those	  of	  another	  person	  in	  this	  village	  who	  play	   in	  the	  other	  role	  and	  we	  will	  pay	  you	  
accordingly.	  	  
Now	  let’s	  start	  the	  game.	  
******	  
P1)	  You	  are	  chosen	  to	  play	  as	  Player	  1.	  Both	  you	  and	  player	  2	  are	  given	  300	  LKR	  as	  initial	  endowment.	  
Now	  you	  have	  to	  decide	  how	  much	  of	  the	  initial	  amount	  you	  may	  want	  to	  send	  to	  player	  2,	  knowing	  
that	  we	  will	  multiply	  it	  by	  three	  and	  player	  two	  might	  send	  you	  back	  some	  or	  no	  money.	  	  
1. 	  How	  much	  of	  your	  initial	  endowment	  of	  300	  LKR	  do	  you	  give	  to	  the	  other	  player?	  	  
! 0,	  so	  player	  2	  will	  receive	  0	  
! 30,	  so	  player	  2	  will	  receive	  90	  
! 60,	  so	  player	  2	  will	  receive	  180	  
! 90,	  so	  player	  2	  will	  receive	  270	  
! 120,	  so	  player	  2	  will	  receive	  360	  
! 150,	  so	  player	  2	  will	  receive	  450	  
! 180,	  so	  player	  2	  will	  receive	  540	  
! 210,	  so	  player	  2	  will	  receive	  630	  
! 240,	  so	  player	  2	  will	  receive	  720	  
! 270,	  so	  player	  2	  will	  receive	  810	  
! 300,	  so	  player	  2	  will	  receive	  900	  
2. How	  much	  money	  do	  you	  think	  that	  the	  second	  player	  will	  give	  you	  back?__________	  (you	  
earn	  50	  LKR	  for	  correct	  guess)	  	  	  
3. How	  much	  do	  you	  think	  the	  player	  2	   is	  expecting	   from	  you?	  (you	  earn	  50	  LKR	  for	  correct	  












4. Why	  did	  you	  give	  the	  money	  to	  the	  other	  person?	  (just	  one	  option)	  
!  [1]	  	  I	  trust	  him	  
!  [2]	  	  I	  hope	  that	  he	  will	  give	  me	  back	  the	  same	  or	  more	  than	  that	  I	  gave	  
him	  
!  [3]	  	  It	  makes	  me	  feel	  good	  that	  he	  gains	  money	  
!  [4]	  I	  don’t	  like	  a	  different	  treatment	  between	  me	  and	  him	  
5. What	  is	  the	  minimum	  amount	  of	  money	  you	  would	  need	  to	  receive	  from	  the	  other	  player	  
in	  order	  not	  to	  feel	  cheated?	  If	  I	  get	  less	  than	  ________	  I	  feel	  cheated	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*****	  
P2)	  You	  are	  chosen	  to	  play	  as	  Player	  2.	  Both	  you	  and	  player	  2	  are	  given	  300	  LKR	  as	  initial	  endowment.	  
You	  have	  to	  decide	  for	  each	  possible	  amount	  sent	  by	  the	  first	  player,	  how	  much	  you	  feel	  like	  to	  return.	  
Keep	  in	  mind	  that	  whatever	  the	  first	  player	  send	  you	  will	  be	  tripled	  by	  us.	  	  
	  
1. How	  much	  LKP	  do	  you	  give	  back	  in	  each	  case:	  
-­‐	  If	  the	  other	  person	  sends	  you	  	  0	  	  and	  you	  receive	  	  0	  	  you	  would	  give	  back	  	  	  	  	  ________	  	  	  	  
-­‐	  If	  the	  other	  person	  sends	  you	  30	  	  and	  you	  receive	  90	  	  you	  would	  give	  back	  	  	  ________	  	  	  	  
-­‐	  If	  the	  other	  person	  sends	  you	  60	  and	  you	  receive	  180	  you	  would	  give	  back	  	  	  ________	  	  	  	  
-­‐	  If	  the	  other	  person	  sends	  you	  90	  and	  you	  receive	  270	  	  you	  would	  give	  back	  	  	  ________	  	  	  	  
-­‐	  If	  the	  other	  person	  sends	  you	  120	  and	  you	  receive	  360	  you	  would	  give	  back	  	  ________	  	  	  	  
-­‐	  If	  the	  other	  person	  sends	  you	  150	  	  and	  you	  receive	  450	  you	  would	  give	  back	  	  	  ________	  	  	  	  
-­‐	  If	  the	  other	  person	  sends	  you	  180	  and	  you	  receive	  540	  you	  would	  give	  back	  	  	  ________	  	  	  	  
-­‐	  If	  the	  other	  person	  sends	  you	  210	  and	  you	  receive	  630	  you	  would	  give	  back	  	  ________	  	  	  	  
-­‐	  If	  the	  other	  person	  sends	  you	  240	  and	  you	  receive	  720	  you	  would	  give	  back	  	  	  ________	  	  	  	  
-­‐	  If	  the	  other	  person	  sends	  you	  270	  and	  you	  receive	  810	  you	  would	  give	  back	  	  	  ________	  	  	  	  
-­‐	  If	  the	  other	  person	  sends	  you	  	  300	  	  and	  you	  receive	  	  900	  	  you	  would	  give	  back	  	  ________	  	  	  	  
2. How	  much	  LKR	  do	  you	  expect	  the	  first	  player	  has	  sent	  to	  you?	  (you	  earn	  50	  LKR	  for	  correct	  












3. Why	  did	  you	  give	  back	  the	  money	  to	  the	  other	  person?	  (just	  one	  option)	  
!  	  [1]	  I’m	  a	  person	  one	  can	  rely	  on	  
!  	  [2]	  I	  don’t	  like	  that	  he	  gets	  much	  less	  than	  me	  
!  	  [3]	  It	  makes	  me	  feel	  good	  that	  he	  gains	  money	  
!  	  [4]	  I	  don’t	  like	  a	  different	  treatment	  between	  me	  and	  him	  
4. What	  is	  the	  minimum	  amount	  of	  LKR	  you	  think	  you	  need	  to	  return	  in	  order	  not	  to	  make	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A.3	  INSTRUCTIONS	  -­‐	  GAME	  "RG"	  
Today	  you	  are	  given	  the	  chance	  to	  play	  and	  earn	  real	  money;	  depending	  on	  your	  decision	  in	  this	  game	  
you	  may	  earn	  up	  to	  900	  LKR.	  	  This	  game	  is	  based	  on	  an	  investment	  decision.	  	  
	  
We	  give	  to	  you	  300	  LKR	  and	  ask	  you	  to	  choose	  between	  the	  following	  alternatives:	  
• option	  1:	  you	  keep	  the	  300	  LKR	  with	  certainty	  and	  do	  not	  invest	  any	  money.	  
• option	  2:	  you	  invest	  from	  30	  to	  300	  LKR	  in	  an	  economic	  activity.	  You	  keep	  with	  certainty	  the	  
sum	  you	  decided	  not	  to	  invest.	  Then,	  with	  50%	  probability	  you	  earn	  from	  the	  economic	  activity	  
an	   amount	   of	   money	   equal	   to	   the	   invested	   sum	   multiplied	   by	   3.	   Otherwise,	   with	   50%	  
probability	  the	  economic	  activity	  you	  invested	  in	  generates	  for	  you	  no	  returns.	  	  
	  
Once	  you	  have	  chosen	  one	  of	  the	  two	  options,	  we	  pay	  you	  according	  to	  the	  following	  scheme:	  
• If	  you	  choose	  option	  1,	  we	  give	  to	  you	  300	  LKR	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  session	  if	  this	  game	  is	  selected	  
for	  payment.	  
• If	  you	  choose	  option	  2,	  we	  toss	  a	  coin	  and	  a)	  if	   it's	  head	  we	  triple	  the	  amount	  you	  decided	  to	  
invest	   and	   give	   it	   to	   you	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   session	   if	   this	   game	   is	   selected	   for	   payment	   (in	  
addition	   to	   the	  amount	  you	  decided	   to	  keep);	  b)	   if	  not,	  we	  will	   give	  you	   just	   the	  money	  you	  
decided	   to	   keep	   at	   the	   end	   of	   this	   session	   if	   this	   game	   is	   selected	   for	   payment	   (so	   no	   extra	  
returns	  from	  the	  investment).	  
	  
For	   example,	   suppose	   you	   choose	   option	   2	   and	   decide	   to	   invest	   30	   LKR	   and	   keep	   270	   LKR.	   The	  
economic	  activity	  triples	  your	  investment	  with	  50%	  chances.	  So	  we	  toss	  a	  coin	  and	  if	  it's	  head	  will	  give	  
you	  90	  LKR	  as	  returns	  from	  the	  investment	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  270	  LKR	  you	  decided	  to	  keep	  (so	  in	  total	  
270+90=360	  LKR);	  otherwise,	  if	  it's	  not	  head,	  you	  lose	  the	  30	  LKR	  you	  invested	  and	  we	  give	  to	  you	  just	  
the	  amount	  you	  decided	  to	  keep,	  270	  LKR.	  Is	  it	  clear?	  
	  
Now	  let’s	  start	  the	  game.	  
	  
	  
We	  give	  to	  you	  300	  LKR.	  Do	  you	  choose:	  
• option	  1:	  I	  keep	  300	  LKR	  and	  do	  not	  invest,	  or	  
• option	  2:	  I	  invest	  __________LKR	  in	  an	  asset	  which,	  after	  tossing	  a	  coin,	  triples	  my	  investment	  if	  















A.4	  THE	  SURVEY	  
Thanks	   a	   lot	   for	   your	   patience.	   Your	   answers	   will	   be	   kept	   anonymous	   to	   other	   people	   in	   the	  
village	  and	  to	  the	  AMF's	  staff.	  We	  will	  really	  appreciate	  if	  you	  can	  answer	  in	  a	  truthful	  way.	  (See	  
appendix	  B)	  	  
*****	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A.3	  INSTRUCTIONS	  -­‐	  	  LOTTERY	  GAME	  	  
Now	  we	   give	   to	   you	   the	   chance	   to	   participate	   into	   a	   lottery	  we	   are	   running.	   If	   you	  will	   be	   selected	  
among	  all	  the	  people	  we	  interview,	  you	  can	  win	  at	  least	  10,000	  LKR.	  	  
You	  have	  to	  decide	  which	  option	  you	  prefer	  in	  8	  cases.	  In	  each	  of	  these	  8	  cases,	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  if	  you	  
prefer	  to	  receive	  after	  two	  months	   the	   lottery	  prize	  of	  10,000	  LKR	  or	  after	  eight	  months	  a	  prize	  of	  an	  
increasing	   amount	   in	   each	   option.	   So,	   you	   have	   to	   choose	   which	   of	   the	   two	   alternative	   forms	   of	  
payment	  would	  you	  prefer	  if	  you	  won	  the	  lottery.	  	  
For	   example,	   the	   first	   option	  will	   be	   "would	  you	  prefer	  to	  win	  10,000	  LKR	  after	  two	  months	  after	  this	  
interview,	  or	  10,100	  after	  eight	  months	  after	  this	  interview?"	  So	  you	  choose	  one	  of	  the	  two	  alternatives.	  
This	  option	  will	  be	  repeated	  8	  times;	  in	  each	  of	  these	  we	  keep	  fixed	  the	  amount	  to	  be	  received	  “after	  
two	  month”	  (10,000	  LKR)	   in	  case	  of	  winning	  while	  the	  amount	  “after	  eight	  months”	  will	  be	  gradually	  
increased	  option-­‐by-­‐option	  until	  14,142	  LKR.	  
All	  the	  people	  interviewed	  in	  this	  research	  will	  participate	  in	  this	  lottery.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  this	  research,	  
we	  will	  extract	  from	  an	  urn	  one	  out	  of	  all	  the	  names	  of	  people	  we	  interviewed;	  that	  person	  will	  be	  the	  
only	  winner	  of	  this	  lottery.	  Then,	  we	  extract	  from	  another	  urn	  a	  number	  from	  1	  to	  8	  and	  we	  will	  pay	  
the	  winner	  according	  to	  his/her	  choice	  in	  the	  option	  number	  equal	  to	  the	  one	  extracted.	  For	  example,	  
if	  the	  number	  selected	  is	  5,	  we	  will	  pay	  the	  winner	  the	  sum	  of	  money	  corresponding	  to	  his/her	  choice	  
in	  option	  5.	  If	  the	  winner	  chose	  to	  receive	  "10,000	  after	  two	  months",	  we	  will	  transfer	  that	  amount	  via	  
“Western	   Union”	   after	   two	   month	   from	   his/her	   interview	   date;	   if	   instead	   she/he	   chose	   to	   receive	  
"10,368	  after	  eight	  months",	  we	  will	  be	  paying	  10,368	  LKR	  after	  eight	  months	  from	  his/her	  interview	  
date.	  
Is	  it	  clear?	  	  
Let´s	  start.	  	  
	  
Please	  select	  only	  one	  of	  the	  two	  choices	  for	  each	  of	  the	  following	  8	  options.	  
Option	  n.	   	   A	   B	  
1	   If	  you	  won	  the	  lottery,	  would	  you	  like	  to	  receive:	   10,000	  after	  2	  month	   10,100	  after	  8	  months	  
2	   If	  you	  won	  the	  lottery,	  would	  you	  like	  to	  receive:	   10,000	  after	  2	  month	   10,198	  after	  8	  months	  
3	   If	  you	  won	  the	  lottery,	  would	  you	  like	  to	  receive:	   10,000	  after	  2	  month	   10,368	  after	  8	  months	  
4	   If	  you	  won	  the	  lottery,	  would	  you	  like	  to	  receive:	   10,000	  after	  2	  month	   10,607	  after	  8	  months	  
5	   If	  you	  won	  the	  lottery,	  would	  you	  like	  to	  receive:	   10,000	  after	  2	  month	   10,840	  after	  8	  months	  
6	   If	  you	  won	  the	  lottery,	  would	  you	  like	  to	  receive:	   10,000	  after	  2	  month	   11,180	  after	  8	  months	  
7	   If	  you	  won	  the	  lottery,	  would	  you	  like	  to	  receive:	   10,000	  after	  2	  month	   12,247	  after	  8	  months	  
8	   If	  you	  won	  the	  lottery,	  would	  you	  like	  to	  receive:	   10,000	  after	  2	  month	   14,142	  after	  8	  months	  
	  
	  
IMPORTANT:	  If	  you	  will	  be	  the	  winner	  you	  will	  receive	  the	  money	  according	  to	  your	  extracted	  choice.	  
If	   you	   do	   not	   receive	   any	   notification	   nor	   payment	   after	   8	  months	   from	   the	   date	   of	   this	   interview,	  
unfortunately	  you	  have	  not	  been	  extracted.	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APPENDIX	  B	  –	  THE	  SURVEY	  
 
Code number ___________ 
 
Survey Data 
Question Answer  
 
1  Experimenter name  
2  Date  
3  Time  
4  District  
5  Type of locality (urban/rural)  
  
Personal Information 









Other identification number. Specify 
___________________ 
7  Name   
 
8  Family name   
 
9  Full Address / Locality 
 
  




11  Birthday (DD/MM/YYYY) 
 
  
12  Years of formal education   






























15  Number of people living in the house 
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17  Years of formal education of your wife/husband/fiancée    
 
18  Years of formal education of your father 
 
  





Economic Performance Indicators 













Full-Time Employed (30 hours or more) 






Unable to Work 
Other. Specify 
 






















Full-Time Employed (30 hours or more) 






Unable to Work 
Other. Specify 
 






















2,500 – 5,000 Rs. 
5,000 – 7,500 Rs. 
7,500 – 10,000 Rs. 
10,000 – 12,500 Rs 
12,500 – 15,000 Rs 
> 15,000 Rs 
25 1
8 
How many hours per week do you work?   
26 1
8 
How many hours per week does your 





How important from 1 (min) to 10 (max) are theseincome 










Sri Lanka’s Government subsidies 






0.2  Consumption (2011) 
28 2
1 
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Does it happen to you to have problems in buying or 









How much do you usually spend for food per month within 
your household? (in local currency) 
  














Not applicable (no self consumption) 









Private medical consultation fees 
Not reimbursed medicines 
Cigarettes and tobacco/alcohol/gambling 
Entertainment and leisure (pic nic, restaurants, cinema, 
DVD, theatre, sport etc.) 
Others. Specify 
No 
33  Does your household own any transportation mean? If 
yes, please specify if it is necessary for your business (B) 








Van or car 
Tractor 




Loan or credit-related questions 












MFI (other than Agro Micro Finance) 
Family member or close friends 
Others. Specify. 
Never received a loan 
35 2
7 













I did not need a credit and they (Bank, AMF, other 
MFI) went to my place to offer the possibility of 
obtaining one 
I needed a credit and they (Bank, AMF, other MFI) 
went to my place to offer the possibility of 
obtaining one 
I needed a credit and I spontaneously went to 
their place to ask for it (Bank, AMF, other MFI)  
I needed a credit and  I went to their place (Bank, 




36  How important was the support provided by AMF after the 
tsunami for your economic recovery (whether in terms of a 












⁪Not that important 
  Indifferent 
 N/A 
37  How far was your house from the AMF’s office (in km) at 
the time of your first loan? 
  
38  Were you able to repay the loan obtained before the 









In the period 2007- today: 
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Impossibility to repay the loan 
Conditions too strict 
Co-signers refused to pay for me 
No need for a loan 
AMF refused 
Other. Specify. 
Do not remember 
Refuse to answer 
 
39.2 









If yes, when?  
 
  
   
For the year 2011… 










If 40 or 41 are yes, why did you take the loan? 








Start a new business 
Improve the outstanding business 




























Have you asked for money, apart from Agro Micro 







MFI (other than Agro Micro Finance) 
Family member or close friends 










MFI (other than Agro Micro Finance) 
Family member or close friends 




 If yes, was the sum of these amounts greater or smaller 









48 c Please indicate if you/people you know have received 
these different types of aid 
 You (y) Relatives (r) Others (o) 
a. Money      
b. Credit     
c.  Food     
d. Medicines     
e. Raw material for repairing/rebuilding your 
house 
 
   
f. Tools     
g. Consumption     
h. Others. Specify.     
49 2
8 
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Not at all 
 
Happiness, life satisfaction and self-esteem 








Not too happy 
Not at all happy 
52 4
1 
All considered, how satisfied are you with your life from 1 





All considered, which is your level of self-esteem from 1 




54  Generally speaking, would you say that most people can 





Most people can be trusted 
Have to be careful 
55 4
3 























a) “Nowadays, you can’t rely on anybody ” 
Agree   
 Neither agree or not agree 
 Disagree 
 Can't choose 
 Refuse to answer   
 
b) “If you are not careful, other people will take 
advantage of you” 
Agree   
 Neither agree or not agree 
 Disagree 
 Can't choose 
 Refuse to answer   
 
c) If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as 
soon as possible, no matter what the costs   
Agree   
 Neither agree or not agree 
 Disagree 
 Can't choose 
 Refuse to answer   
56  Do you belong to any group?   [1] yes - [0] no 
a. Sporting group   
b. Neighbour group   
c. Religious group   
d. Community groups   
e. Cultural group (music, dance, etc.)   
f. NGO   
g. Political Party   




All considered, how would you judge your level of health 
from 1 (not at all satisfied) to 10 (fully satisfied)? 
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58  What is your weight (in kg)? 
 
  


















62  How far was your house located from the coast at the time 




Did you make any of the following dwelling improvements 







New walls                       When? _______ 
New floors                      When? _______ 
New roof                         When? _______ 
New sanitary services    When? _______ 
Other. Specify                When? _______ 
 No 
64  What material are the walls of the main dwelling 















Wood only  
Corrugated iron sheet 
Grass/Straw 
Tin 
Other. Specify       
65  What material is the roof of the main dwelling 








Corrugated iron sheet  
Tiles 
Concrete 
Asbestos sheet  
Grass 
Tin 
Other. Specify       











Piped into dwelling 
Public tap 
Tube-well/borehole with pump 
Protected dug well 
Protected spring 
Rainwater collection 




Other. Specify       







Flush toilet  
Ventilated improved pit latrine 
Uncovered pit latrine 
Covered pit latrine 
Bucket 
None 
Other. Specify       
68  Which of the following things does your household own?  Yes [1]  no [0]  
a. TV, DVD player   
b. Mobile phone   
c. Fridge   
d. Water pump   
e. Plowing machine   
f. Gas stove   
 
Video questions 
69  Which of the following the video mostly remind you about?    Solidarity (Altruism / Cooperation)____ 
Looting (Opportunism)____ 
Calamity (Tsunami/Natural disasters)____ 
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Recalling Tsunami 
70  Immediately after the Tsunami, what did you mostly 





Solidarity (Altruism / Cooperation) 
Looting (Opportunism)                        
Post traumatic stress disorder 
When thinking about the 2004 tsunami... 
71  Your pain was caused by an accident resulting in injury 








72  You feel upset or nervous when exposed to events that remind you of the original 







73  Since the injury, you find yourself avoiding places or  activities that would remind 







74  You have recurrent and intrusive recollections of the events surrounding your 







75  You have experienced recurrent dreams about the events surrounding your 










77  You have suddenly felt or acted as if the accident were recurring because of 
some incident or thought that reminded you of the original events causing your 







What kind of damages did you suffer from the tsunami?    a) Family members  
 [1] Dead 
  [2] Permanently injured 
  [0] No 
      
     b) House 
  [1] Totally damaged 
  [2] Partially damaged 
  [0] No 
      
     c) Economic activity 
  [1] Totally damaged 
  [2] Partially damaged 
  [0] No 
      
     d) Buildings/assets 
  [1] Totally damaged 
  [2] Partially damaged 
  [0] No 
      
  [1]  e) Working tools 
  [2] Totally damaged 
  [0] Partially damaged 
    No 
      
      
     f) Raw materials 
  [1] Totally damaged 
  [2] Partially damaged 
  [0] No 
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APPENDIX	  C	  –	  THE	  VIDEO	  
	  
ENGLISH	  VERSION	  OF	  THE	  SCRIPT	  
	  
The	  December	  2004	  Indian	  Ocean	  tsunami	  produced	  catastrophic	  damage	  along	  Sri	  Lanka’s	  
eastern	   and	   southern	   coastlines.	   About	   100,000	   homes	   were	   destroyed	   and	   65%	   of	   the	  
country’s	  fishing	  fleet	  was	  damaged	  or	  lost.	  
The international public response to the December disaster was impressive, as local and 
international communities contributed an unprecedented volume of assistance to the affected 
countries. In the first days, efforts concentrated on saving and preserving lives, before quickly 
turning to the prevention of disease. In Sri Lanka, 51 welfare centres were opened up on the day of 
the disaster, and more than 600 more within one week. Shelter, food, water, clothing, sanitation and 
medicine have all been provided. Designated areas have been created where children can safely 
play and recover from the trauma they have suffered.  
Families were assisted through cash grants, cash for work, and microfinance programmes: 21,522 
families in all affected districts have been able to reach   a better standard of living. About US$ 55.2 
million have been invested in the national road rehabilitation and in the reconstruction of access 
roads, irrigation and village roads and about 2.2 million of US$ have been used for the 
reestablishment of community based organizations, reconstruction of basic village-level 
infrastructure facilities, and reconstruction of damaged local government and district offices in the 
South of the country.  
 
The video is available at: https://www.dropbox.com/s/8fgtfsl53ykroxq/Sri%20Lanka%201.mov  
	  
	  
	  
